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The BP Blowout and the Social and
Environmental Erosion of the Louisiana
Coast
Daniel A. Farber*
“There, shockingly, along the grassy bayou bank, I can now
make out a dozen or so old tombs, all in different stages of
submersion, tumbling brick by brick into the bayou water . . . .
The bayou is swallowing the dead here.”1 This quote comes
from a book, whose subtitle says it all: “The Rich Life and Tragic Death of Louisiana’s Cajun Coast.” The author, Mike Tidwell, observes that the “whole ragged sole of the Louisiana
boot, an area the size of Connecticut . . . is literally washing out
to sea . . . taking with it entire Cajun towns and an age-old way
of life.”2 But the Louisiana coast is not the only part of the Gulf
that is in deep trouble, and the Cajuns are not the only group to
suffer the consequences.
Despite the attention the Gulf of Mexico (the Gulf) has received since the BP Deepwater Horizon blowout, it may take
years before the consequences of this disaster will be fully understood.3 All of this attention to the spill is warranted by the
magnitude of the disaster. It risks, however, obscuring the context surrounding the spill itself. Members of the public who
were following events might well have supposed that the spill
was a gigantic blot on an otherwise unblemished natural coast© 2012 Daniel A. Farber
* Sho Sato Professor of Law and Chair, Energy and Resources Group, at the
University of California, Berkeley. An earlier version of this article was presented as part of the Lecture Series on Law, Health & the Life Sciences at the
University of Minnesota on October 7, 2010. Audience members and commentators provided helpful questions and suggestions. Daniel Kolta provided outstanding research and drafting assistance.
1. MIKE TIDWELL, BAYOU FAREWELL: THE RICH LIFE AND TRAGIC DEATH
OF LOUISIANA’S CAJUN COAST 29 (2003).
2. Id. at 6.
3. See Cain Burdeau & Seth Borenstein, Gulf Survival: Scientists Lower
Gulf Health Grade, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 19, 2010),
http://www.usnews.com/science/articles/2010/10/19/gulf-survival.html.
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line and thriving marine ecosystem. But even before the spill,
the Gulf waters, the U.S. Gulf Coast, and the communities that
live on the coast were all under threat.4
The spill was only one more insult to a region already suffering ongoing harm. In July 2010, an Associated Press survey
asking Gulf scientists to rate the status of the Gulf on a 0 to
100 scale, with 0 being dead and 100 being pristine, found the
region to be a 71.5 In October, this number dropped only 6 additional points to 65.6 To explain this relatively small drop, one
must understand the history of social and environmental erosion of the Louisiana coast.
Like the Gulf’s ecosystems, some human coastal communities were especially vulnerable to the incremental harm of the
spill because of their already precarious positions. Also lost in
the discussion of the oil spill’s impacts have been the disproportionate effects upon certain communities—communities that
have been no strangers to the steady deterioration of the Gulf
of Mexico. Long before oil began to spew into the Gulf of Mexico
on April 20, 2010, the Gulf had been paying the price for unchecked development, aggressive extraction of oil and natural
gas, and an attitude of indifference to environmental conse-

4. See, e.g., ROBERT R. M. VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE 16−17 (2010)
(noting that since the nineteenth century scientists have raised concerns about
the limits on the use of wetlands). At present, the definitive discussion of the
spill itself seems to be NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL
SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE
FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING (2011) [hereinafter BP OIL SPILL COMM’N].
The National Commission also provides a good summary of the situation facing the Gulf today.
The largest and most formidable challenges, however, are to bring
balance and efficiency to the Gulf’s shared marine resources, and to
address the rapid and continuous loss of wetlands, barrier islands,
and shorelines comprising the Mississippi Delta and associated
Chenier Plain of southwestern Louisiana. While many areas along
the Gulf Coast require such restoration, the Mississippi Delta and the
Gulf itself requires [sic] special attention.
Id. at 199.
While this article was in press, the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Task
Force issued a preliminary draft of its policy recommendations which emphasizes the need to consider the spill in the context of the Gulf’s other environmental problems and of the needs of coastal communities. See Press Release:
Gulf Coast Task Force Releases Ecosystem Restoration Strategy, available at
http://www.epa.gov/gulfcoasttaskforce/.
5. Burdeau & Borenstein, supra note 3.
6. Id.
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quences.7
The recent focus on the BP oil spill overlooks thousands of
environmental indignities visited on the Gulf over the last several decades. The Gulf is littered with around 4000 offshore oil
and gas platforms and tens of thousands of miles of pipeline in
the central and western Gulf of Mexico, where ninety percent of
the country’s offshore drilling takes place.8 Even before the BP
oil spill, over half a million gallons of oil had spilled in various
accidents.9 The Gulf of Mexico has had to absorb the environmental consequences of upriver use of fertilizers and pesticides
and an array of point-source pollution.10 Bombs, chemical
weapons, and other ordnance litter the Gulf’s floor, after frequent dumping in the middle of the twentieth century.11 As we
will see, these are only some of the threats facing the Gulf.
This Article begins in Part I with a survey of the multitudinous troubles facing the Gulf and its communities before the
Deepwater Horizon spill. Those troubles range from a disappearing coastline to invasive species and an aquatic dead zone.
Part II discusses the spill itself and its impact. At present, the
impacts of the spill do not seem to be as catastrophic as initially feared, but the spill has made a bad environmental situation
worse. Part III then considers some affirmative steps that could
help address the long-term deterioration of the Gulf Coast.
Dramatic improvement would require expenditure of large
amounts of federal money and passage of new federal legislation protecting the Gulf, neither of which seems likely at present. However, while adding to the woes of the Gulf, the spill
also provides opportunities to build institutional and informational infrastructure that, over time, can help slow or reverse
the deterioration of the Gulf.
It would be gratifying to offer a master plan for fixing the
Gulf, but such a plan would be fruitless without a degree of political commitment that is unlikely in at least the next decade.
There are many small initiatives that can cumulatively begin
to make inroads on the Gulf’s problems, including, most obviously, efforts to ensure that the BP oil spill is not followed by
similar disasters. Rather than attempting to catalogue all of
7. Id.
8. Campbell Robertson, Gulf of Mexico Has Long Been Dumping Site,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2010, at A1.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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those potential initiatives, this Article focuses on efforts to
build the governance and information infrastructure that can
provide the framework for future initiatives. Combined with
individual reform efforts, these institutional infrastructure improvements can have a synergistic effect, helping to energize
and support future efforts in the same direction.
In many ways, the situation in the Gulf is a preview of
problems that will be facing the United States and the world in
years to come due to climate change.12 Sea level rise is one of
the most predictable effects of climate change.13 Apart from the
unknown contribution of melting from Greenland and Antarctica,14 the simple change in temperature of the oceans will contribute to thermal expansion, just as increased temperature
causes the mercury in a thermometer to rise.15 This rise in sea
level will result in loss of coastal lands,16 inundation of some
estuary systems with salt water, salt water intrusions into
some drinking sources, and increased exposure to flood damage.17 Two-thirds of all U.S. coastal wetlands would be lost with
a one-meter rise in sea level.18 In terms of ecology, even moderate climate change will trigger significant extinctions.19

12. For scientific background on climate change, see DAVID ARCHER &
STEFAN RAHMSTORF, THE CLIMATE CRISIS: AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO
CLIMATE CHANGE (2010).
13. See, e.g., K. Hasselman et al., The Challenge of Long-Term Climate
Change, 302 SCIENCE 1923, 1924 fig. 1 (2003) (predicting a two-meter increase
in sea level under a “business as usual” scenario by year 2100, but only twenty
centimeters under an optimum regulatory strategy).
14. NICHOLAS STERN, THE STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 20 (2007); see also RICHARD ALLEY ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 4–5 (2007).
15. Changes in ocean temperature will also affect fish stocks. See Hans O.
Portner & Rainer Knust, Climate Change Affects Marine Fishes Through the
Oxygen Limitation of Thermal Tolerance, 315 SCIENCE 95 (2007).
16. A. BARRIE PITTOCK, CLIMATE CHANGE: TURNING UP THE HEAT (2005).
Examples include China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the United States.
Id. at 264, 268, 278.
17. See ELIZABETH KOLBERT, FIELD NOTES FROM A CATASTROPHE: MAN,
NATURE, AND CLIMATE CHANGE 123–24 (2006) (indicating that what are now
hundred-year floods could become routine by late this century); see also
PITTOCK, supra note 16, at 118 (stating that without adaptive measures, annual flood losses would increase by ₤ 1–24 billion in different scenarios).
18. THOMAS R. KARL ET AL., GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 84 (Thomas R. Karl et al. eds., 2009).
19. Id. at 162.
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The Gulf is already experiencing many of these ills, but
scientists project even more severe changes due to climate
change throughout the Southeast: loss of barriers to hurricane
storm surges, rapid salt-water intrusion into coastal forests and
freshwater aquifers, droughts leading to wildfires and drying of
lakes, ponds, and wetlands, extinction of aquatic species, and
declining fish and shellfish populations due to the rapid loss of
coastal marsh are all possible.20
In these respects, like the proverbial canary in the coal
mine, what we see today in the Gulf Coast is an early warning
indicator of trouble ahead. We will have to worry about disappearing wetlands and other changes in many parts of the United States. The Gulf offers us the opportunity to learn how to respond to these challenges before they become widespread.
I. PUTTING THE BP OIL SPILL IN ITS CONTEXT
What was the Gulf like before the big spill? We cannot understand the spill in isolation. Rather, we need to understand
the human communities, geological changes, and ecosystems
that were already in place before the spill.
The Gulf is not just another coastal strip or water body,
and its coastal communities are not fungible with those on the
Atlantic or the Pacific shores. The Gulf Coast is home to some
unique communities, having their own distinctive cultures and
histories.21 These communities have long been under threat because of deterioration of fishing and because the very land on
which they rest has begun to vanish into the water.22 These

20. Id. at 115–16. The effect of the spill itself on these problems is not yet
known. There is particular uncertainty about the effects on deep water biological communities. According to the National Commission,
Because the Deepwater Horizon spill was unprecedented in size, location, and duration, deepwater ecosystems were exposed to large volumes of oil for an extended period. It will take further investigation
and more time to assess the impacts on these ecosystems, their extent
and duration. Unfortunately, except for studies that have focused on
rare and specialized communities associated with rocky outcrops or
seeps, scientific understanding of the deepwater Gulf ecosystem has
not advanced with the industrial development of deepwater drilling
and production.
BP OIL SPILL COMM’N, supra note 4, at 182.
21. See generally VERCHICK, supra note 4, at 16 (“[W]e are all tangled up
in a maze of pipelines, industry, and marine commerce that interacts with
community, culture, recreation, and tourism . . . . [A] hodge podge of human
activities.”).
22. Id. at 16−19.

2 FARBER FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE)

42

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

2/15/2012 12:19 PM

[Vol. 13:1

communities are the subject of Part A.
Part B discusses the environmental threats facing the Gulf
even before the BP Deepwater Horizon blowout. A recent estimate is that environmental risks could cost the Gulf as much
as $350 billion in economic loss over the next twenty years; notably, one sponsor of the study was Swiss Re, a leading international reinsurance company.23 The harm done by the BP oil
spill is an add-on to the other impeding threats.
Part C discusses the barriers that have long prevented effective response to these issues. The Gulf has sometimes
seemed as distinctive in its resistance to environmental protection as in its ecology and culture. Much of the information
needed to address problems in the region is yet to be developed,
so too for the governance structure to implement solutions.
These longstanding barriers will not give way overnight, but
Part III of the article will suggest some incremental efforts to
address them.
A. COASTAL COMMUNITIES
Other parts of the country were founded by farmers and
ranchers. Before oil and gas development, however, the Gulf
Coast was primarily used for fishing, trapping, and transportation.24 Even today, it is home to fishing communities with
unique histories and cultures. The earliest non-native inhabitants of the coast were refugee Acadians from Canada.25 The
modern-day Cajuns are the descendants of the Acadians expelled from modern day Nova Scotia and resettled in the
marshes of Louisiana.26 The Cajuns settled on the coast because other cultures had already laid claim to much of the inland territory, but they found that there was little agricultural
land available among the marsh and swamp lands.27 Traditionally, farmers—the displaced Acadians—were forced to adapt to
a lifestyle focused on fishing.28 From these unique marshland
23. News Release, Entergy, Entergy Study Finds Environmental Risks
Could Coast Gulf Coast $700 Billion (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.entergy.com/
news_room/newsrelease.aspx?NR_ID=1906.
24. VERCHICK, supra note 4, at 16.
25. Herbert R. Padgett, Physical and Cultural Associations on the Louisiana Coast, 59 ANNS. ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 481, 481 (1968).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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beginnings, the Cajuns of Louisiana developed a distinct and
complex cultural identity, expressed in language, food, dance,
folklore, and other traditions.29 Cajun culture is not unitary;
rather, “Cajun identity is so distinct that each town often has
its own cuisine, musical style, and dialect.”30
The oil spill has threatened Cajun culture because it challenges traditional fishing livelihoods and threatens to undermine the Cajun tradition of self-reliance. Many of the small
fishing communities in the Louisiana coastal zone have been in
existence for 200 years or more.31 These communities turned to
capturing “fish, crawfish, frogs, and the collection of Spanish
moss (used for mattress filler),” and selling these products to
nearby New Orleans.32 As fishing technology developed in the
1950s and 60s, these communities increasingly relied on saltwater fisheries and shellfisheries for their livelihood.33 As the
bounty of the Gulf declines along with the region’s environment, the Cajun people face greater uncertainty when they
take to their fishing boats.
In addition to Cajuns, the coast is also home to around
20,000 Native Americans.34 For instance, tribes in southern
Louisiana depend on marshlands that were inundated by Hurricanes Rita and Katrina, with eighty percent of the homes
flooded.35
Besides these coastal communities, other aspects of the region are connected with the coast. Although not (yet) physically
on the coast, New Orleans is closely tied to the coastal ecosystem. If all the wetlands were lost, the city would only be twenty-five miles from the coast and even more vulnerable to hurricanes.36 Shipping is a key industry, further tying the city to the
coast.37 Although jazz has been replaced by hip hop and rap as
popular music, the city retains a distinctive culture with “the

29. Mark Guarino, BP Oil Spill Imperils Cajun Culture, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2010/0806/
BP-oil-spill-imperils-Cajun-culture.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. VERCHICK, supra note 4, at 142.
35. Id.
36. DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE: HURRICANE KATRINA, NEW
ORLEANS, AND THE MISSISSIPPI GULF COAST 12 (2006).
37. Id. at 31.
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bohemian-anarchistic-libertarian mix of an international port
city.”38
New Orleans is also home to vulnerable communities. Prior
to Hurricane Katrina, two-thirds of the population was African
American.39 During the post-World War II industrial boom, the
chemical and plastics industries built up factories in disenfranchised, predominantly black neighborhoods.40 Each year these
industrial complexes release millions of pounds of carcinogens.41 In Mossville, Louisiana, residents have three times the
dioxin level of the national average.42 The Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights has agreed to hear a petition
from residents of Mossville.43 It is the first environmental case
from the U.S. to go before the Commission.44 Minority communities were also impacted by more recent events. Many communities of Asian Americans (especially Vietnamese) were devastated by hurricanes in New Orleans and by the decline in the
fishing industry.45
These communities should be subjects of special concern
for several reasons. First, they are often politically and economically disempowered, ill-prepared to protect their own interests
either in the political arena or the marketplace. Second, these
communities and their unique cultures are not readily portable.
If their livelihoods, lands, or homes are destroyed, individuals
may relocate but communities’ ties and distinctive cultures
may be lost. In a society where migration and mass media tend
to homogenize our culture, we should prize these unique communities and their distinctive histories.
B. THE GULF ECOSYSTEM
When the BP oil spill began, the Gulf of Mexico was already suffering the effects of a century of environmental neglect. The spill was simply the latest blow to a damaged ecosys38. Id. at 29, 47.
39. Id. at 33.
40. Ike Sriskandarajah, Living on Earth, PUB. RADIO INT’L (Apr. 26,
2010),
http://www.pri.org/science/environment/human-rights-in-cancer-alley
1965.html.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. VERCHICK, supra note 4, at 142.
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tem. This section surveys the preexisting problems: disappearing wetlands, a growing dead zone, and threatened biodiversity. Because so many coastal communities depend on fishing for
their livelihoods, these communities are inevitably impacted
when ecosystems are eroded by human activities. Indeed, many
of them are seeing the very land beneath their feet erode away.
1. Disappearing Wetlands
Disappearing wetlands are in some ways the most obvious
of the Gulf’s problems. Their disappearance is a particular concern because they provide benefits that extend far beyond the
swamplands and marshes themselves. Coastal wetlands provide many ecological services:
In addition to storm protection services, the Louisiana coastal plain
provides many other benefits. It offers habitat for countless species,
including commercially significant sea life and waterfowl. Fisheries in
the Gulf of Mexico provide about [twenty] percent of all seafood consumed in the United States. Nearly all of that catch is dependent, in
some way, on the universe of microscopic plant and animal life first
nurtured in the coastal plain. With more than five million birds wintering in Louisiana, the Louisiana coastal plain provides crucial rest
stops to migrating birds. Finally, Louisiana’s coastal marshes provide
services that are vital to water quality. . . . The coast’s storm protection, habitat, and water treatment services, while impossible to precisely quantify, surely amount to billions of dollars of commercial
benefit per year.46

Since the 1930s, however, one-third of Louisiana’s wetlands, an area the size of Delaware, has disappeared.47 Data
from a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service wetlands survey show
that, though the rate of loss has slowed, Louisiana is still losing
32,000 acres of wetland every year.48 At the current rate of wetland loss, by the year 2040, Louisiana will have lost more than

46. VERCHICK, supra note 4, at 18–19. According to the National Commission, the Gulf Coast produces more than one third of domestic seafood supply,
diverse fish nursery and feeding grounds, and “some of the best beaches and
waters in the United States for recreation and tourism.” BP OIL SPILL
COMM’N, supra note 4, at 187. “Coastal tourism and commercial fisheries generate more than $40 billion of economic activity annually in the five Gulf
States.” Id.
47. Ken Wells, Collapsing Gulf Marsh Dwarfs Oil Spill as Ecological Disaster, STATESMAN.COM (Sep. 7, 2010, 9:41 PM), http://www.statesman.com/
news/nation/collapsing-gulf-marsh-dwarfs-oil-spill-as-ecological-902420.html
(footnote omitted).
48. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WETLAND EXTENT, CHANGE, AND
SOURCES OF CHANGE,
available
at
http://cfpub.epa.gov/eroe/index
.cfm?fuseaction=detail.viewInd&lv=list.listByAlpha&r=188230&subtop=202.
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one million acres of coastal wetlands since 1978. As a result,
fisheries could decline by thirty percent and wildlife dependent
on the marshes would suffer.49 Louisiana’s wetlands account for
forty percent of total wetlands in the continental United States,
and the state also accounts for eighty percent of wetlands lost.50
There are multiple causes of the rapid loss of these freshwater
wetlands: levees along the Mississippi built in 1927 prevent silt
from reaching the wetlands, natural contraction of peat soils,
and geological settling.51 While it is difficult to attribute a percentage of environmental degradation to human activities, the
offshore drilling industry has substantially contributed to the
rapid destruction through dredging for drilling rigs, pipelines,
and navigation channels.52
After the catastrophic levee failures that allowed Hurricane Katrina’s floodwaters to advance into the heart of New Orleans, efforts to restore and enhance the city’s flood protection
system have largely failed to consider the effects of human development upon the region’s natural defenses.53 Louisiana’s
wetlands are an incredible ecological resource, and their steady
destruction left the city more vulnerable than it otherwise
would have been.54 Further, wetlands are essential to the
health of Louisiana’s fish and seafood industry, they shelter
and feed five million migratory birds annually, filter pollutants
from the water, and help slow storm surges.55 The barrier islands in the Gulf of Mexico have also gradually disintegrated,
at least in part due to human activities, leaving the vast system of sheltered wetlands along Louisiana’s delta plain increasingly exposed to open-gulf conditions.56
In addition to increased erosion, coastal wetlands have also
suffered because of declines in the countervailing forces that
build and maintain the lands. After floods in 1927, the United
49. COASTAL WETLANDS, PROTECTION AND RESTORATION ACT, MANAGING
AGENCIES, WETLAND LOSS IN LOUISIANA (1997), http://www.lacoast.gov/rep
orts/rtc/1997/5.htm.
50. Judith Perhay, Louisiana Coastal Restoration: Challenges and Controversies, 27 S.U. L. REV. 149, 155 (2000).
51. Wells, supra note 47.
52. Id.
53. See Bob Sullivan, Wetlands Erosion Raises Hurricane Risks,
MSNBC.COM (Aug. 29, 2005, 9:17 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9118570/.
54. Id.
55. Wells, supra note 47.
56. Sullivan, supra note 53.
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States built levees along the Mississippi that have prevented
silt from reaching Louisiana wetlands.57 Since the construction
of these levees, wetlands have been starved of sediment, causing them to “become waterlogged, sink and die.”58 The silt ends
up uselessly collecting at the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico.59
Thus, efforts to reduce flooding in the Mississippi River basin
have increased the risk of flooding along the coast of the Gulf of
Mexico.60
After Hurricane Katrina, it became apparent that the disappearance of the wetlands created a major risk to the region.61
Wetlands absorb the impact of storms, slowing them down once
they make landfall.62 Storm surges are reduced by approximately one foot for every 2.7 miles of wetlands.63 However, New
Orleans is now increasingly exposed to violent storms because
so many of the wetlands have collapsed, in part due to the levee
system that surrounds the city.64 In addition, barrier islands
provide protection for “half a million people from violent
storms, along with an international commercial-industrial
complex worth billions.”65 Yet, these barrier islands are rapidly
disappearing.66
The problems discussed in this section are on the landward
side of the coastline. All is far from well, however, on the seaward side. There are several other major threats to the health
of the Gulf ecosystem, which are discussed in the next two subsections.
2. The Dead Zone
The dead zone is an unmistakable sign that the marine
ecosystem is under threat. An 18,000 square kilometer seasonal
“dead zone” of low dissolved oxygen threatens marine life on
the Texas-Louisiana shelf. First recognized in the 1970s, the
Gulf of Mexico dead zone is the largest in the Western Hemi-

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Wells, supra note 47.
Id.
Id.
Sullivan, supra note 53.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
VERCHICK, supra note 5, at 34.
Id. at 34–35.
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sphere.67 The size of the dead zone varies from year to year, but
at its largest, in 2002, it covered 22,000 square kilometers—an
area as large as the state of Massachusetts.68 Research suggests that fertilizer leaching from agricultural production along
the Mississippi River may be responsible for the river’s nutrient loading and hypoxia which causes the dead zone.69 Thus,
the zone is at its worst during peak farming months, from May
till September. The Mississippi watershed drains forty-one percent of the land area of the contiguous United States.70 More
than half of the estuaries that experienced a hypoxic event are
in the Mississippi River plume.71
Dead zones throughout the world have spread exponentially since the 1960s—the Gulf being a prime example.72 The area
of hypoxia shrinks to less than 5000 square kilometers during
years with low river flow.73 However, the dead zone more than
triples in size during periods of high flow.74 While climate
change promises to have complicated effects on the dead zone,
climate models predict that climate change will deplete oceanic
oxygen by increasing stratification and change rainfall patterns
so as to cause increased discharges from the Mississippi River.75
Even apart from climate change, however, the situation is
very serious. Each spring, a massive slug of nutrients flows
down the Mississippi River and empties into the Gulf of Mexico, forcing aquatic life to flee or else suffocate.76 Hypoxia leaves
habitats inhabitable. For example, “[i]n marine systems, when
oxygen levels fall to within 1.0–2.0 ml/liter, mobile organisms,
67. EUGENE H. BUCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MARINE DEAD ZONES:
UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM 7 (2007).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 8.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 6.
72. Robert J. Diaz & Rutger Rosenberg, Spreading Dead Zones and Consequences for Marine Ecosystems, 321 SCIENCE 926, 926 (2008).
73. Id. at 928.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 929.
76. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 59, 60 (2010). For detailed scientific information about the hypoxia issue, see ELIZABETH B. JEWETT ET AL., COMM. ON ENV’T AND NATURAL
RES., SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF HYPOXIA IN U.S. COASTAL WATERS 11–22
(2010).
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such as pelagic fish, begin to migrate out of the affected area.”77
The current and future potential effects upon Gulf species of
the growing hypoxic region include: “(1) altered coastal phytoplankton based food webs, (2) noxious algal blooms, (3) altered
benthic ecosystems, (4) reduced economic productivity in both
commercial and recreational fisheries, and (5) both direct and
indirect impacts on fisheries, such as direct mortality and altered migration which may lead to declines in populations and
landings.”78
Despite the destruction to life, the federal government has
been unable or unwilling to take substantial action to limit the
upriver fertilizers and manures causing the damage.79
A thirty percent decrease in the Mississippi River nitrate
influx, according to model simulations, would reduce the frequency of hypoxia by thirty-seven percent.80 However, a twenty
percent increase in Mississippi River discharge, thought possible as a result of climate change, would increase the frequency
of hypoxia by the same amount.81 Therefore, if climate change
does substantially increase discharges, it may be necessary to
decrease nitrogen flux by more than thirty percent if policymakers become serious about addressing hypoxia.82
3. Threats to Biodiversity
The Gulf of Mexico is home to twenty-eight species of marine mammals, including six that are listed under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) as endangered.83 Five species of turtles
in the region are listed under the ESA.84 These animals are
concentrated in areas that provide shelter, feedings, and places
suitable for reproduction.85 The extent to which these optimal

77. Mary L. Belefski & Larinda T. Norton, Hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico:
A Historical and Policy Perspective, 12 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 331, 335 (1999).
78. Id. at 338.
79. See BUCK, supra note 67, at 13–16.
80. Nancy Rabalais et al., Simulated Responses of the Gulf of Mexico Hypoxia to Variations in Climate and Anthropogenic Nutrient Loading, 42 J.
MARINE SYSTEMS 115, 115–126 (2003).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., AN OVERVIEW OF PROTECTED
SPECIES COMMONLY FOUND IN THE GULF OF MEXICO 5 (2006),
http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdf/Protected%20Species%20In%20GOM-web
%20version%202-7-08.pdf.
84. Id. at 6.
85. Id. at 8.
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habitats have suffered as a result of the oil spill depends upon
whether oil comes into contact with these habitats.86 However,
because much oil and gas extraction occurs in or near habitats
of protected species, there is a particular danger when a spill
occurs.87 The risks of a spill are amplified because oil-drilling
platforms serve as underwater islands that often provide artificial habitat to a wide array of species.88 Rapid, severe declines
in coastal and oceanic shark populations in the northwest Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico have led to population loss of ninetynine percent of some species.89
The Bluefin tuna is a species in the Gulf that is being
closely monitored in the wake of the oil spill.90 Since 1950, the
Bluefins have been in rapid decline.91 A twenty-year plan to rebuild the stock has utterly failed.92 A new model suggests that
two cyclonic eddies—preferred spawning areas for the Bluefin
tuna—were substantially contaminated by the oil spill at the
exact time that spawning should be occurring.93 The Bluefin is
now under consideration for listing as an endangered species.94
The Bluefin is representative of many struggling species in the
Gulf of Mexico that could be dealt a fatal blow by the oil spill.
Climate change promises to have many complex, and mostly negative, effects on the Gulf of Mexico. Rising waters will increase coastal erosion.95 Indeed, as early as 1990, Congress
made an official finding that “[t]here is a growing need to plan

86. BP OIL SPILL COMM’N, supra note 4, at 178.
87. Id. at 83.
88. Id. at 174–75. (discussing how the spill also impacted the deepwater
bathypelagic zone, which contains cold-water corals, fish, bacteria, mussels
and tubeworms, as well as diving sperm whales).
89. Andrea Thompson, Shark Population Collapse Causing Other Species
to Vanish, FOXNEWS.COM (Apr. 2, 2007), http://www.foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,262486,00.html. See generally BP OIL SPILL COMM’N, supra note 4, at
178 (discussing that species with essential habitats near the spill included
sharks of various kinds, swordfish, marlin tuna, and sailfish).
90. BP OIL SPILL COMM’N, supra note 4, at 180–81.
91. Julia Whitty, Bluefin Tuna Spawning Mid-Spill Right Now, MOTHER
JONES (May 28, 2010, 3:29 PM), http://motherjones.com/blue-marble/2010/05/
bluefin-tuna-spawning-mid-spill-right-now.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Allison Winter, Gulf Spill Spurs U.S. to Weigh Protections for Bluefin
Tuna, GREENWIRE (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/
print/2010/10/12/21.
95. KARL ET AL., supra note 18, at 12.
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for sea level rise” in light of global warming and its effect on
sea level.96 Most importantly, marine habitats have already
suffered significant losses for a variety of reasons—including
coastal agricultural, industrial, and urban development.97 Climate change is expanding the range of some fishes and decreasing the range of others with unpredictable results.98 While
some foundation species may be able to keep pace with changes
to the ecosystem by migrating landward, this depends on water
rising at a sufficiently slow rate. A recent study found regional
increases in air and sea surface temperatures of greater than
3ºC over a thirty-year period.99 This change in temperature correlates with northern shifts in the distribution of warm water
fishes in the Gulf of Mexico.100
Circulation patterns and the input of freshwater drive
productivity and connectivity within the Gulf of Mexico.101 The
movement of three species of fish, the Atlantic goliath grouper,
red grouper, and tilefish is in part controlled by these circulation patterns and the flow of freshwater.102 In turn, these fishes
have a profound shaping effect upon their habitats, which likely influences the livelihood of many other species in the Gulf.103
Biodiversity exists in a delicate balance, and climate change
may have a disruptive effect upon this balance.104
Invasive species are also a threat to the Gulf ecosystem.
The Gulf of Mexico Program (GMP) sponsors a multistakeholder Invasive Species Focus Team, focusing on shrimp
viruses, ballast water, and the prevention of new introductions
of invasive species.105 The majority of the Invasive Species Focus Team’s efforts have been on addressing the first two of the96. Coastal Zone Reauthorization Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101508, § 6202(a)(7), 104 Stat. 1388-300 (1990).
97. Felicia Coleman & Christopher Koenig, The Effects of Fishing, Climate Change, and Other Anthropogenic Disturbances on Red Grouper and
Other Reef Fishes in the Gulf of Mexico, 50 INTEGRATIVE & COMP. BIOLOGY
201, 208 (2010).
98. Id. at 208–09.
99. Joel Fodrie et al., Climate-Related, Decadal-Scale Assemblage Changes of Seagrass-Associated Fishes in the Northern Gulf of Mexico, 16 GLOBAL
CHANGE BIOLOGY 48, 48 (2009).
100. Id.
101. Coleman & Koenig, supra note 97, at 202.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 204–05.
104. Id.
105. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 855-R-00-003, AN INITIAL SURVEY OF AQUATIC
INVASIVE SPECIES ISSUES IN THE GULF OF MEXICO REGION 4 (2000).
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se three.106 The GMP works with the five Gulf States to develop
action plans “to minimize introductions and impacts of invasive
species.”107 Twenty-five of seventy-five non-indigenous species
in the Gulf of Mexico are fish species.108 At least ten of these
were deliberate introductions.109 An additional fifteen fish species represent unintentional releases from aquaria.110 Thus,
with an eye to fishing, human demands have been put before
the natural balance of the Gulf. While GMP may strive to reverse the trend towards the proliferation of invasive species, it
is unclear whether its efforts can cancel out the forces that
have brought so many invasive species to the Gulf in the first
place.
C. BARRIERS TO ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE GULF
The Gulf is blessed in many respects, but the capacity to
protect the regional environment is not one of them. The Gulf is
backward in environmental matters. Commitment to regulation and scientific research in the Gulf States has always
lagged behind other areas of the United States.111 The Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) funding for the Gulf is a
fraction of what is allocated to the Chesapeake Bay Program
and Great Lakes Program.112 Environmental groups in the Gulf
are poorly organized and lack resources, and many of the prominent nation-wide environmental groups do not have an office
in the region.113 Because of lack of support from the Gulf
States, many environmental groups have been hesitant to
commit resources to the Gulf region.114 A culture of environmental disinterest has been fostered in the Gulf States largely

106. Id. at 40.
107. Id. at 4.
108. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ERDC/TN ANSRP-05-4, INVASIVE AND
ESTUARINE ANIMALS OF THE GULF OF MEXICO 3 (2005).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Robertson, supra note 8, at A14. According to the National Commission, “[u]nfortunately, comprehensive data on conditions before the spill—the
natural ‘status quo ante’ from the shoreline to the deepwater Gulf—were generally lacking.” BP OIL SPILL COMM’N, supra note 4, at 174.
112. Laura Tuma, The Gulf of Mexico Gets a Helping Hand, TEX.
COMMISSION ENVTL. QUALITY, http://www.tceq.texas.gov/assets/public/comm
_exec/pubs/pd/020/04-04/gulf-x.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2011).
113. Robertson, supra note 8, at A14.
114. Id.
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because these state governments fear the economic consequences of more rigid enforcement of environmental laws.115
The Gulf States have often resisted tougher regulations or
stricter enforcement of existing regulations because of fears
that such changes could chase away much needed jobs.116 With
complicit states and the absence of watchdog environmental
groups, environmental violations often go unreported or unpunished.117 Kieran Suckling of the Center for Biological Diversity
remarked, “The environmental movement was either so far removed from it that it was unaware, or it was aware and afraid
to challenge it because of local politics . . . . Or it was unwilling
to challenge because it has written off the gulf as America’s
dumping ground.”118 Notably, of a thousand lawsuits filed by
environmental groups against federal agencies regarding inadequate or absent environmental impact statements, only one
involved oil and gas operations in the Gulf.119
While organizations like Natural Resources Defense Council, Center for Biological Diversity, and Earthjustice have offices in the Chesapeake Bay and Great Lakes regions, they have
no presence in Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi.120
Earthjustice does have an office in Florida, but its office appears to be primarily concerned with the Everglades and other
Florida-specific environmental issues.121 While the oil spill did
grab these organizations’ attention, it is unclear whether they
will remain involved in the Gulf of Mexico now that the crisis is
over. As discussed in Part III, it is important to obtain additional funding to make this feasible.
The challenges facing the Gulf of Mexico are many and
daunting. Although the Clean Water Act has been effective at

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Mike Soraghan, Gulf Spill: Enviro Groups Ignored Gulf Before BP
Disaster, N.Y. TIMES: GREENWIRE (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
gwire/2010/09/27/27greenwire-enviro-groups-ignored-gulf-before-bp-disaster96055.html.
RES.
DEF.
COUNCIL,
120. See
About
NRDC,
NATURAL
http://www.nrdc.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2011); Contact Us, CTR. FOR
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/about/contact/in
dex.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2011); Contact Us, EARTH JUSTICE,
http://earthjustice.org/about/contact (last visited Sept. 13, 2011).
121. See Florida, EARTH JUSTICE, http://earthjustice.org/about/offices/flor
ida (last visited Sept. 9, 2011).
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regulating point source pollution from specific factories and
waste plants throughout much of the country, nonpoint source
pollution has been intractable.122 The Gulf of Mexico may provide the most blatant example of the disastrous effects of this
regulatory shortcoming. Many upstream states contribute to
the growing dead zone problem in the Gulf of Mexico, and even
if the Gulf States could mobilize to address environmental
problems, the upstream states would have little incentive to
reduce the nitrogen and other chemicals flowing down the Mississippi River.123 While national environmental groups might
be able to bring attention to the complex environmental issues
facing the Gulf of Mexico, members of these groups have found
much of the Gulf to be a hostile fundraising and political atmosphere.124 For decades, the Gulf States have fostered a lax
political culture that prioritizes business interests over ecosystem health.125 The Gulf States are among the poorest in the nation, and their state governments fear the economic consequences of more rigorous environmental laws and
enforcement.126
When all these obstacles are considered together, it is apparent that there will be no silver bullet for the Gulf of Mexico.
As it has taken many generations to create such a dramatic environmental problem in the region, it may take a serious commitment of economic and scientific resources over a comparable
period of time to significantly restore the Gulf of Mexico.
II. THE BP OIL SPILL AND ITS AFTERMATH
The Gulf of Mexico received national headlines for weeks
during the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The spill is described in Part A of this section, while its impact, particularly
on vulnerable communities, is discussed in Part B.
A. THE SPILL
An informed observer in the spring of 2010 would have
known that the situation in the Gulf was not good. But things
were about to get even worse. On April 20, 2010, while drilling
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Robertson, supra note 8, at A14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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at the Macondo Prospect about fifty-two miles southeast of
Venice, Louisiana, an explosion on the Deepwater Horizon
caused by a blowout killed 11 of 126 crewmen.127 Two days later, despite efforts to put out the blaze on the oil rig, the
Deepwater Horizon sank in 5000 feet of water.128 On April 23,
the Department of Homeland Security stated the incident “poses a negligible risk to regional oil supply markets and will not
cause significant national economic impacts.”129 White House
Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, too, minimized the nature of the
incident, announcing, “I doubt this is the first accident that has
happened and I doubt it will be the last.”130 However, on this
same date, President Obama issued a statement identifying the
blowout as a “number one” priority, and BP officials acknowledged the threat of catastrophic environmental consequences.131
On April 24, 2010, oil was confirmed to be leaking from the
well, and the next day the U.S. Coast Guard announced its intention to use remote underwater vehicles to stop the leak.132
Throughout the end of April, May, and June, estimates of the
flow of oil increased from 1000 barrels of crude per day (bpd), to
5000 bpd, to as many as 60,000 bpd.133 For perspective, this
could mean that an amount of oil equal to the Exxon Valdez
spill could have been gushing into the Gulf of Mexico every four
days.134 At least one expert predicted the spill flow was even
127. Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig Fire Leaves 11 Missing, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Apr. 21, 2010, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
2010/apr/21/deepwater-horizon-oil-rig-fire.
128. BP
Oil
Spill
Timeline,
GUARDIAN,
July
22,
2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/jun/29/bp-oil-spill-timelinedeepwater-horizon. For a detailed discussion of the events leading up to the
spill, see BP OIL SPILL COMM’N, supra note 4, at 89–122. The Commission
identifies management failures by industry and a dysfunctional regulatory
system as “root causes” of the blowout. Id. at 122–27. The accident resulted
from clear mistakes made in the first instance by BP, Halliburton, Transocean, and government officials who, relying too much on industry’s assertions
of the safety of their operations, failed to create and apply a program of regulatory oversight that would have properly minimized the risks of deepwater
drilling. Id. at 127.
129. BP Oil Spill Timeline, supra note 128.
130. Id.
131. Suzanne Goldenberg, Fear of Ecological Disaster Played Down After
Oil Rig Collapse in US, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Apr. 24, 2010, at 36.
132. BP Oil Spill Timeline, supra note 128.
133. Justin Gillis, Estimates of Oil Flow Jump Higher, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 15,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/16/us/16spill.html.
134. Id.
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higher than 60,000 bpd.135
In May 2010, Congress learned that BP, Halliburton Company, and Transocean Ltd. ignored safety warnings in the
hours before the Deepwater explosion, and a group of Minerals
Management Service scientists claimed they were pressured to
change the findings of internal studies if they predicted a substantial danger of an accident or harm to the Gulf ecosystem.136
On May 16, BP began to draw some of the spewing oil up to the
surface using a tube inserted into the leaking pipe; however,
this strategy proved largely ineffective at recovering a substantial portion of the oil.137 On May 18, the no fishing zone covered
nineteen percent or about 90,000 square miles of the Gulf of
Mexico.138 BP announced on June 6 that a containment cap was
capturing 10,000 bpd.139 On July 7, the Associated Press released an investigation indicating that there were 27,000
abandoned oil wells in the Gulf, some dating back to the 1940s,
and many badly sealed.140 This investigation thus forced the
public to confront the possibility that other major leaks were
possible. On July 15, BP finally stopped the flow of oil for the
first time in nearly three months.141 And about three weeks
later on August 4, BP executed a successful ‘static kill,’ and a
cement plug introduced on September 19 left the well effectively dead and the crisis officially over.142
B. ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN IMPACTS
Although the oil leak has been stopped, there are continued disputes over the environmental impacts of the spill. For
example, it is unclear to what extent oil will continue to pollute
the Gulf coast, whether species such as the dwarf seahorse can
overcome the loss of so much of its habitat, and whether dispersants used during cleanup efforts may have unforeseen conse-

135. Richard Harris, Gulf Spill May Far Exceed Official Estimates, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (May 14, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyId=126809525.
136. BP Oil Spill Timeline, supra note 128.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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quences on the environment.143
In a July 2010 report, the Scientific American noted that
oil often includes highly toxic compounds—such as
napthalenes, benzene, toluene, and xylenes—capable of seriously affecting humans, animals, and plants.144 With inhalation
and ingestion of these compounds being the most dangerous
mode of exposure, there is a risk of mutations that can reduce
fertility and cause cancer and other serious problems.145 Some
16,000 species inhabit the Gulf, and it is difficult to predict
what long-term effects the oil spill will have on them.146
Columbia University’s National Center for Disaster Preparedness interviewed 1200 adults on the Gulf Coast during
the oil spill and found that the spill had seriously impacted the
health and economic viability of Gulf Coast communities.147
Twenty percent of Gulf Coast residents reported a drop in income, and more than twenty-five percent thought they might
have to move away from the Gulf.148 Forty percent said they
had experienced physical health problems that they attributed
to the spill, and thirty percent reported that their children had
experienced physical health issues or mental distress from the
spill.149
African Americans, Southeast Asians, and Native Americans in the region are often heavily dependent on the seafood
industry for jobs.150 The National Environmental Justice Advisory Council called for federal agencies to target disaster response efforts to communities of color and Native Americans,

143. Id. The difficulties encountered in closing the well are discussed in BP
OIL SPILL COMM’N, supra note 4, at 129–70.
144. David Biello, Lasting Menace, SCI. AM., July, 2010, at 16.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Survey of Coastal Residents Shows Gulf Oil Spill Has Significant Impact on Families, SCI. DAILY (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.sciencedaily.com/relea
ses/2010/08/100803132740.htm.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See Native American Group Hit Hard By Oil Spill, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(June
3,
2010),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=
127405886&sc=emaf (transcript available with online recording); Mark
Schleifstein, Environmental Justice Concerns Arising from Gulf of Mexico Oil
Spill Aired, TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 15, 2010, http://www.nola.com/news/gulfoilspill/index.ssf/2010/06/environmental_justice_concerns.html;
Gia
Grier
McGinnis, BP Oil Spill Spurs More Action for Gulf Environmental Justice,
SUITE101 (July 11, 2010), http://www.suite101.com/content/bp-oil-spill-spursmore-action-for-gulf-environmental-justice-a260120.
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groups that have historically been overlooked.151 In response to
concerns that the oil spill was having disproportionate effects
on minority communities, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson
added staff to incorporate environmental justice concerns, including access to better consultation with government and environmental testing information.152 “People of the Gulf Coast
need our support today more than ever before,” Jackson said.153
She concluded, “The people who are most vulnerable to the impacts of this spill must be empowered during our response and
the long-term recovery.”154
The Vietnamese community in the Gulf provides a powerful example of how certain minority groups face particular dangers after the oil spill. Many Vietnamese in the Gulf are refugees whose families have fished for generations.155 Many
Vietnamese in the region do not possess other skill sets. Furthermore, many in this Vietnamese community have poor English language skills, and adjusting to depleted fisheries will
thus involve this additional language hurdle.156 During the oil
spill crisis, the federal government also did not do a great job of
communicating the details of the fishing closures to nonEnglish speakers.157 Some older Vietnamese fishermen were
stopped and fined because they did not know that areas were
closed to fishing.158
Perhaps the greatest cause for concern in the environmental justice community has been the disposal of oil-related debris
in communities of color. BP has been relying on landfills in
neighborhoods where mainly African Americans, Latinos, and
Asians live.159 BP’s federally approved waste disposal plan

151. McGinnis, supra note 150.
152. Schleifstein, supra note 150.
153. Id.
154. Id. This article focuses on the environmental justice (EJ) implications
of the spill itself. For a study of EJ issues involving the response to the spill
and the compensation system, see Hari M. Osofsky et al., Environmental Justice and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (forthcoming, NYU Environmental Law Journal) (on file with author).
155. See BP OIL SPILL COMM’N, supra note 4, at 193 (noting that roughly
one-fifth of the Southeast Asian immigrants on the Gulf Coast are fisherman).
156. Schleifstein, supra note 150.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Robert D. Bullard, BP’s Waste Management Plan Raises EnvironmenVOICE
(July
29,
2010),
tal
Justice
Concerns,
DISSIDENT
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ships oil spill garbage to nine dump sites in the South.160 In five
out of nine of the facilities, minorities comprise a majority of
residents living near the disposal facilities.161 People of color
comprise about twenty-six percent of the population in coastal
counties.162 The disproportionate environmental burden BP’s
dumping plan places on minority communities compounds the
burden these communities already bear, including the difficulty
of the Hurricane Katrina recovery, economic paralysis, and racial inequality.163
The Houma Nation and other Native American groups fear
that the cultural and economic impacts from the loss of fishing
activities will be too great to overcome.164 The United Houma
Nation is an Indian Tribe with 17,000 members that lives in
the bayous of Southeast Louisiana.165 The tribe is recognized by
the state of Louisiana, but is not federally recognized, which
means that the tribe does not enjoy the benefits inherent to
federal recognition such as support by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.166 Like other coastal communities, many members of the
tribe are economically and culturally tied to the fishing industry.167 The oil spill is only the latest chapter of exploitation that
the oil industry has visited on the Houmas.168 In the 1950s and
http://dissidentvoice.org/2010/07/bp%E2%80%99s-waste-management-planraises-environmental-justice-concerns/ (commenting on how African American
and Latino communities have been and continue to be used as dumping
grounds for various types of waste).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Michelle Chen, BP’s Dumping Oil-Spill Waste in Communities of Color, Study Finds, COLOR LINES (Aug. 3, 2010), http://colorlines.com/archives/
2010/08/environmental_racism_surfacing_in_bp_spill_waste_management.ht
ml (recounting the trials faced by minority populations in the Gulf region due
to the BP oil spill). For further discussion of the issue, see Osofsky et al., supra
note 154, at MS 13–17.
164. Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig Fire Leaves 11 Missing, supra note 127.
165. Native American Group Hit Hard By Oil Spill, supra note 150 (detailing the history of the Houma Nation and how the tribe has been affected by
the oil spill).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. As the BP Oil Spill Commission puts it, “Just as they began to recover from four hurricanes in three years, many members of Gulf coastal tribal
communities for whom fishing is a lifestyle and a livelihood, suffered directly
from the oil spill and face a difficult future.” BP OIL SPILL COMM’N, supra note
4, at 194. Like Cajuns, tribal members also face disappearing lands. As a former chief explained, “When I was little there were fields that we [the Houma
People] raised cattle and horses on. We had gardens and the kids played base-
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60s, the oil and gas industry conned poorly educated Houma
Indians into signing away their land.169 Canal digging also allowed saltwater intrusion into tribal areas.170 The Houmas are
one more coastal community that is teetering on the brink, and
it remains to be seen whether their unique culture and way of
life can withstand yet another attack.
It is not only minority cultures, such as the Houmas and
Cajuns, that have been affected by the spill or the Gulf’s other
problems. But these cultures are of special concern because
they are less capable of protecting their interests through the
democratic process or private sector. These cultures, with their
unique histories, also add something distinctive to the American mix. We are at risk of losing these communities along with
the land and the fisheries that support them.
III. SEEKING A WAY FORWARD: SCATTERED RAYS OF
SUNSHINE THROUGH DARK CLOUDS
The Gulf presents a witch’s brew of chronic environmental
harm, acute pollution, and threatened communities. Given the
complexities of the problems and the organizational and political difficulties, it would be unrealistic to propose any simple solution. There are, however, some positive steps that could improve the situation. Part A discusses the potential for more
comprehensive ecosystem management in the Gulf, which could
help address some of the chronic environmental problems. Part
B discusses some ways that the BP Oil spill might provide the
occasion for at least modest forward progress.
A. CREATING THE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR EFFECTIVE POLICY
COORDINATION
The Gulf of Mexico Program (GMP) was initiated in 1988
by the EPA as a non-regulatory program.171 The GMP was
founded on principles of partnership, science-based information, and citizen participation.172 The GMP was modeled afball. Now there is no such thing. The backyards are water.” Id. at 203.
169. Native American Group Hit Hard By Oil Spill, supra note 150.
170. Id.
171. See generally What is the Gulf of Mexico Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/gmpo/about/whatisgmp.html (last updated May
7, 2010) (describing the background, challenges, partnerships and priorities of
the Gulf of Mexico Program).
172. Id.
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ter the Great Lakes and Chesapeake Bay Programs, all striving
to apply principles of adaptive management to address complex
ecosystem degradation.173 The GMP accepted the reality that
no one agency or institution has the capacity to “fix” the Gulf
on its own. Instead, interested groups and individuals must
work together to address the complex challenges facing the region.174 In 2009, building off of an effort in 2006 to set goals for
regional partnership, the GMP, Gulf States, and Federal government completed a five-year Action Plan addressing the most
pressing issues in the Gulf.175 The Action Plan centers on addressing hypoxia and ensuring the continued sustainability of
the Gulf Coast economy.176
The GMP was created and funded largely at the insistence
of congressional delegations seeking to receive the same attention given to the Great Lakes and Chesapeake Bay.177 While
these delegations did secure some funding for the GMP, it has
remained insubstantial when compared to the Great Lakes and
Chesapeake Bay counterparts.
An impressive $475 million is being used to launch a new
Great Lakes Restoration Initiative.178 President Obama’s Great
Lakes Restoration Initiative is the largest such effort in two
decades.179 In February 2010, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson
issued a five-year Action Plan intended to “operationalize” the
lofty goals previously set for restoration of the Great Lakes region.180 Jackson envisions spending a total of $2.2 billion for
executing the Action Plan.181 The Great Lakes Interagency
Task Force aligns eleven U.S. cabinet and federal agency heads
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GREAT LAKES RESTORATION INITIATIVE
PROPOSED 2010 FUNDING PLAN 1 (2009) (describing the funding details of the
Great Lakes Restoration Initiative).
179. GREAT LAKES RESTORATION INITIATIVE (Feb. 21, 2010),
http://greatlakesrestoration.us/?p=445 (noting on its homepage that this is
“the largest investment . . . in two decades” with the report elaborating on the
Action Plan for the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative).
180. Henry Henderson, Hope for an Effective “Great Lakes Action Plan”,
NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL STAFF BLOG (Feb. 22, 2010),
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/hhenderson/hope_for_an_effective_great_la.h
tml (reporting on the details and likely effectiveness of the “Great Lakes Action Plan”).
181. Id.
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to coordinate restoration efforts for the Great Lakes region.182
This task force emphasizes collaboration between state and local governments, Native American tribes, members of Congress, citizen groups, and the Canadian government in order to
achieve the protection and sustainable use of environmental
and natural resources.183
The outcome-oriented Great Lakes Restoration Initiative
will focus on toxic substances and other selected areas of concern; invasive species; near shore health and nonpoint source
pollution; habitat and wildlife protection and restoration; and
accountability, monitoring, evaluation, communication, and
partnerships.184 All Great Lakes States currently have fish consumption advisories.185 A new invasive species arrives in the
Great Lakes on average every eight months.186 Pollution from
nonpoint sources continues to wreak havoc on fragile Great
Lakes ecosystems.187 Precious habitat is being attacked by any
number of factors, including development and competition with
invasive species.188 The new Initiative recognizes that the status quo is the continued deterioration of the region and that serious resources are needed to stem this downward trend.189
Like the Great Lakes Program, the Chesapeake Bay Program has been well-coordinated and well-funded. The Chesapeake Bay Commission was created in 1980 to coordinate policy-making in the region and serve as the legislative arm of the
Chesapeake Bay Program.190 Fifteen legislators from three
states—Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania—the governors
of each of these states, and three citizen representatives work
together to manage biodiversity, land conservation, and water
quality.191
182. Great Lakes Interagency Task Force, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/greatlakes/iatf/ (last updated Apr. 7, 2009).
183. Id.
184. See generally GREAT LAKES RESTORATION INITIATIVE, supra note 189,
at 16.
185. Id. at 7.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See id.
190. Policy for the Bay, CHESAPEAKE BAY COMM’N, http://www.chesbay.us/
(last visited Sept. 26, 2011) (describing the members and history of the Chesapeake Bay Commission).
191. Id.
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The specific responsibilities of the Commission are the following:
Identifying concerns requiring interjurisdictional coordination and
cooperation; [c]ollecting, analyzing, and disseminating information
pertaining to the region and its resources for the respective legislative
bodies; [r]ecommending legislative and administrative actions necessary to encourage effective and cooperative management of the bay;
[r]epresenting the common interests of the member states as they are
affected by the activities of the federal government; [p]roviding an arbitration forum to serve as an advisory mediator for conflicts among
the states.192

Over a ten-year period ending in 2004, Maryland, Virginia,
Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia invested $2.7 billion to restore the Chesapeake Bay.193 Eleven federal agencies
contributed an additional $972 million.194 These funds were
specifically used for “water quality improvements, sound land
use, vital habitat protection and restoration, living resource
protection and restoration, and stewardship and community
engagement.”195
While the Great Lakes and Chesapeake Bay are clearly
important to the welfare of the United States, it is difficult to
provide an explanation for why federal funding for these two
regions should so dramatically outpace that for the Gulf of
Mexico. Taking the Great Lakes region as an example, it is obvious why it makes sense to protect an area that provides some
thirty million Americans with drinking water and represents
the foundation of a multi-billion dollar economy.196 Still, the
Gulf of Mexico, with its wealth of resources and many coastal
communities, would seem to be of similar significance to the
nation. Yet, congressional appropriations for the GMP peaked
in 1993, 1994, and 1995, at just over $4 million.197 Since 1995,
funding for GMP has actually been in decline, despite the continued challenges facing the region.198 In 1999, the extramural
budget was nearly halved from its peak, standing at $2.2 mil192. R.I. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (2004).

BAY TRUST COMMISSION FINDINGS

BAY
PROGRAM,
193. Funding
and
Financing,
CHESAPEAKE
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/fundingandfinancing.aspx?menuitem=14907
(last visited Sept. 26, 2011) (reporting on the costs associated with the restoration of the Chesapeake Bay).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See GREAT LAKES RESTORATION INITIATIVE, supra note 179, at 6.
197. Belefski & Norton, supra note 77, at 339–40.
198. Id.
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lion.199 The GMP office has only 13.8 full-time employees.200
Considering these numbers alone, it is not surprising that the
GMP has not been able to turn the tide on environmental decline in the region.
As of 2004, the Great Lakes Program and Chesapeake Bay
Program were funded at a combined $35 million per year.201
Although the Gulf of Mexico is the most economically productive body of water in North America, relied upon by millions to
provide income, the Gulf only receives a fraction of the funding
commanded by the Great Lakes and Chesapeake regions.202
Unlike the Great Lakes and Chesapeake Bay Programs, the
GMP must be funded each year from EPA’s operating budget,
thus creating an additional layer of unpredictability of funding.203 Although the GMP strives to make the most of the funding through the use of communications, education, and partnerships, it simply does not have the resources to ensure the
protection of public health, stem the influx of pollutants, or restore habitats.204 While there have been individual success stories, such as the restoration of the Bahia Grande wetlands,
many other ecosystems have been left in steady decline.205
New programs to support Gulf restoration have been proposed by the Obama Administration, but the details of some of
these federal plans remain vague, and the financing is viewed
as inadequate to reverse a history of environmental neglect.206
There have been some reasons to be optimistic, “including a
new four-year, $320 million federal initiative dedicated to substantially reducing the nitrogen coming into the gulf by work-

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See Funding and Financing, supra note 193 (“[s]ince 1995, the EPA
funding . . . has remained steady at about $20 million annually); Great Lakes
National Program Office, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://epa.gov/greatlakes
/about.html (last updated Feb. 24, 2009) (“USEPA’s Great Lakes National
Program Office . . . [has] a budget of almost $15 million).
202. Belefski & Norton, supra note 77, at 333, 339–40.
203. Id. at 339–40.
204. Id. at 354–55.
205. Diaz & Rosenberg, supra note 72, at 926–27; James Pinkerton, Bahia
Grande Transformed from Barren to Beautiful, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 2, 2005),
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Bahia-Grande-transformedfrom-barren-to-beautiful-1574830.php.
206. Robertson, supra note 8, at A14.
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ing with agricultural states upriver.”207This initiative is
squarely directed at reducing hypoxia, but it remains unclear
the extent to which this commitment will actually be able to
prevent the flow of nitrogen into the Gulf of Mexico.208 Further,
while the hypoxia issue is one of the most significant problems
facing the Gulf, it is not the only issue; other problems will go
unabated.
In April 2010, the GMP announced another positive development: the Gulf of Mexico Foundation, a private non-profit organization, will receive $1.2 million to coordinate habitat conservation and restoration efforts in the Gulf of Mexico.209 The
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) established a regional partnership with the Gulf of Mexico Foundation in 2001 in an effort to maximize resources allocated to
restore marsh and wetland habitats.210 Yet—although a step in
the right direction—it is doubtful that the Gulf of Mexico
Foundation will make a significant impact with such limited
funding.
The Obama Administration also points to the Interagency
Ocean Policy Task Force as an example of its efforts to improve
the condition of the Gulf.211 Through the task force, the Administration has set forth an initial gulf restoration road map, although details remain vague and uncertain.212 The Obama Administration has already hedged on the potential effectiveness
of the task force, as EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson has
warned that “thorny jurisdictional problems between the federal government and the states” limit the ability of the federal
government to take forceful action in the Gulf.213
Nevertheless, encouraging signs should not be minimized
or ignored. President Obama has highlighted the national significance of the Gulf and the need for serious restoration.214
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. GMF Receives $1.2 Million for Habitat Conservation, GULF MEX.
ALLIANCE
(Apr.
2010),
http://www.gulfmex.org/newsletter/spring2010.
html#habitat.
210. Press Release, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., NOAA Provides
$250,000 to the Gulf of Mexico Foundation (Nov. 15, 2001),
http://www.publicaffairs.noaa.gov/releases2001/nov01/noaa01r114.html.
211. Robertson, supra note 8, at A14.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Erik Stokstad, Looking Beyond the Spill, Obama Highlights Longterm Restoration, 328 SCIENCE 1618 passim (2010).
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Prior to President Obama, the last president who is said to
have expressed any serious interest in the Gulf was Theodore
Roosevelt, a century earlier.215
In an October 5, 2010 executive order, the President may
have taken the largest step forward by establishing another
task force—the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Task Force—
composed of federal agency officials and state representatives,
with the objective of coordinating federal efforts and developing
a restoration strategy for presidential consideration.216 Ecosystem restoration is broadly defined:
“Ecosystem restoration” means all activities, projects, methods, and
procedures appropriate to enhance the health and resilience of the
Gulf Coast ecosystem, as measured in terms of the physical, biological, or chemical properties of the ecosystem, or the services it provides, and to strengthen its ability to support the diverse economies,
communities, and cultures of the region. It includes activity that initiates or accelerates the recovery of an ecosystem with respect to its
health, integrity, and sustainability. It also includes protecting and
conserving ecosystems so they can continue to reduce impacts from
tropical storms and other disasters, support robust economies, and
assist in mitigating and adapting to the impacts of climate change.217

It remains to be seen whether this task force will be successful in devising an effective and politically feasible plan, but
it does provide hope that the attitude of indifference in the region can be broken.
The problems facing the Gulf could not be solved overnight
even by an omnipotent regulatory program with an unlimited
budget. It is inappropriate to use such an idealized regulatory
as our benchmark for assessing progress. Rather, we need to
concentrate on moving the status quo in the right direction,
and in particular on creating a more viable forum for state and
federal officials to coordinate their actions and develop joint
programs. The Obama Administration seems to be moving in
the right direction on these issues, although as with all things
political, the future remains unpredictable.
B. THE BP OIL SPILL AS THE OCCASION FOR NEW INITIATIVES
Some leaders in the Gulf States believe that a dramatic influx of funding for Gulf restoration efforts and infrastructure
improvements could go a long way towards securing the future
215. BRINKLEY, supra note 36, at 12.
216. Exec. Order No. 13,554, 75 Fed. Reg. 62,313 (Oct. 5, 2010).
217. Id.
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of the Gulf States. American engineers point to the Netherlands as an example of where a sustained and serious commitment to flood control has minimized the risk of future flooding.218 American engineers claim that the Dutch are not doing
anything particularly innovative or unique; rather, they have
been willing to spend more than $15 billion to combat the prospect of future flooding.219 It is expected that even more may be
required to restore the Gulf.220 However, while the flood control
infrastructure of the Netherlands is impressive, it provides limited insight on how the Gulf of Mexico can address its own
unique environmental concerns. As anyone who has visited
both would surely realize, Louisiana is not Holland, and the
problems facing the two are different in important respects.
For environmental restoration and flood control to be simultaneously pursued, policymakers must keep both goals in
mind at all times. Further, while the federal government has
discussed the possibility of increasing funding to Louisiana
flood control, there are some doubts as to whether the Army
Corps of Engineers and Louisiana state government are really
in a position to work a dramatic improvement to Louisiana’s
flood infrastructure.221 While it may be true that funding limitations substantially affect the Gulf States and that the Netherlands has shown what can be accomplished with a heavy financial commitment, the complicated and connected challenges
of flood control and environmental restoration likely cannot be
solved with increased funding alone, even if that funding were
to be forthcoming.
This section considers some more modest steps toward
strengthening the planning process and providing better institutional infrastructure to support future planning and regulatory efforts. The suggestions here are not radical or transformative, but they may cumulatively provide momentum for the
process of putting effective environmental protections in place.
Having invested considerable effort and funding over the
course of the last century in creating the problems that now beset the Gulf, we cannot expect overnight solutions.
218. Brett Martel, Louisiana Delegation Studies Flood Control Systems in
the Netherlands, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 7, 2006), http://www.highbeam.com/
doc/1P1-119434688.html.
219. Id.
220. Id.; BP OIL SPILL COMM’N, supra note 4, at 210 (providing estimates of
$15 to $20 billion over the span of thirty years to restore the gulf).
221. Martel, supra note 218.
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1. Improved Regulatory Tools
Despite reasons to remain pessimistic, the BP oil spill continues to represent an important opportunity to reverse the
trend towards environmental and cultural destruction of the
Gulf of Mexico. For instance, the spill has already resulted in
limiting the categorical exclusions that formerly exempted so
much oil and gas leasing activity from scrutiny under National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).222 As Professor Oliver Houck explains, “[a]t bottom, the problem is vision. Neither
the Corps nor the state [of Louisiana] has the history, appetite,
or even the legal authority to take on the job of planning and
managing a sustainable Louisiana coastal zone.”223 Houck thus
makes the difficult but compelling argument that the Gulf
Coast cannot be fully restored, and in fact, the United States as
a society and the Gulf States in particular must begin a frank
discussion about how much of the Gulf Coast can be restored
and where people can most securely reside.224 Houck notes that
NEPA could be a useful tool for evaluating the Gulf coast’s real
alternatives.225 If it is to fulfill this promise, however, it needs
to be taken seriously as a planning tool rather than viewed as
an annoying paperwork requirement. As with other planning
efforts, NEPA will be most useful if it is used in conjunction
with scenario planning and with special emphasis on impacts
on the most vulnerable ecosystems and communities, such as
Gulf Coast coastal communities.226
Another potentially useful tool is Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), which provides an under-utilized lever for
states to control oil and gas development.227 Section 307 of the

222. Boemre Comprehsenive Review of Its Categorical Exclusions for Outer
Continental Shelf Decisions, BUREAU OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REG., &
ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.boemre.gov/eppd/compliance/nepa/policy/ce/in
dex.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).
223. Oliver A. Houck, Retaking the Exam: How Environmental Law Failed
New Orleans and the Gulf Coast South and How It Might Yet Succeed, 81 TUL.
L. REV. 1059, 1082 (2007).
224. Id. at 1083.
225. Id.
226. See Daniel A. Farber, The Challenge of Climate Adaptation: Assessing
Current Planning and the Need for Action-Forcing Requirements, J. ENV. L.
(2011),
available
at
http://jel.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2011/08
/25/jel.eqr015.full.pdf?keytype=ref&ijkey=IhHQEKBZYOxzzrW.
227. 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (2006); see Sam Kalen, The BP Macondo Well Exploration Plan: Wither the Coastal Zone Management Act?, 40 ENV. L. REP.
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CZMA requires federal agencies to carry out any activities
“that affect . . . any land or water use or natural resource of the
coastal zone” consistently (to the maximum extent possible)
with the state coastal zone plan.228 The underutilization of the
CZMA has been partly the result of indefensible resistance by
federal leasing authorities, which the Obama Administration
should terminate post-haste. 229 Despite its political ties to the
petroleum industry, the State of Louisiana actually had tried to
prevent some destructive development using its powers under
the CZMA, despite being supine on other occasions, so a change
in federal policy could have practical impact.230 Other Gulf
States should be encouraged to strengthen their currently weak
CZMA programs.231
It is also time to address the problem of coordinating Gulf
policy. We now have something of a surplus of Gulf coordinating agencies: the Restoration Task Force, the GMP, and the
Gulf of Mexico Alliance. In an ideal world, these groups would
be consolidated. Failing that, perhaps a Gulf coordinating forum could be established where representatives of these different groups could exchange information and harmonize their
plans. Although it was underfunded and proved unable to cope
with fierce disputes among stakeholders, the former joint California-federal collaboration—known as CALFED—provides one
model for “modular” partnerships between regulatory authorities.232
Money may or may not be the root of all evil, as the saying
has it, but it is definitely a prerequisite for combating some of
those same harms. As we saw earlier, regulators, public interest groups, and scientists have been starved of funding in the
Gulf.233 The next subsection addresses some routes to remedying that situation at least in part. Stronger institutional and
informational infrastructure are as crucial for long-term sustainability as physical infrastructure, and like physical infrastructure, they do not come free.

11,079, 11,080–83 (2010).
228. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(A), (C) (2006).
229. Kalen, supra note 227, at 11,081–82.
230. Id. at 11,082–83.
231. See Houck, supra note 223, at 1074–76.
232. Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795 passim (2005).
233. Robertson, supra note 8, at A14; Tuma, supra note 112.
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2. Using Post-Spill Funding to Create Needed Institutional
Infrastructure
Money of various kinds will flow into the Gulf region as a
result of the spill. Most of the money will undoubtedly be used
to address the immediate harms caused by the spill, but the
Gulf will be just as vulnerable in the future unless some of the
funding is used to strengthen critical institutions needed for
sustainability.
The September 2010 Mabus Report calls for the President
to urge Congress to pass legislation that would dedicate a portion of Clean Water Act civil penalties paid by those responsible
for the spill to those impacted by it. 234 Under the current system, money collected under the Clean Water Act must be deposited into the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund and cannot be
put into the Gulf Coast Recovery Fund.235 The Mabus Report
recommends that this policy be changed to allow the Clean Water Act civil penalties to flow into the Gulf Coast Recovery
Fund, that a Gulf Coast Recovery Council be established to
manage these funds and regional recovery efforts, that a percentage of the civil penalties be directed to the Gulf States, and
that some money be set aside for responding to future spills.236
If implemented, this source of funding could also be used to
strengthen the GMP, so as to help ensure that the results of
restoration are not subject to further degradation.
Informational infrastructure in the region also needs
strengthening. BP has already pledged $500 million over the
next ten years for scientific research by Gulf Coast universities,
of which $35 million has already gone out as fast-track grants
to study the impact of the spill.237 The funds will be administered by the Gulf of Mexico Alliance, a partnership of the five
Gulf Coast States.238 This funding will strengthen our infor-

234. RAY MABUS, U.S. NAVY, AMERICA’S GULF COAST: A LONG TERM
RECOVERY PLAN AFTER THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL 4–8, 10, 19–20
(2010), available at http://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/docu
ments/pdf/gulf-recovery-sep-2010.pdf.
235. Id. at 5.
236. Id. at 5–10.
237. BP and the Gulf of Mexico Alliance Announce Implementation of BP’s
$500 Million Independent Research Initiative, BP (Sept. 29, 2010),
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7065262.
238. Id.; see GULF MEX. ALLIANCE, http://www.gulfofmexicoalliance.org/
(last visited Sept. 26, 2011).
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mation base about the ecosystems in the region, but it may also
help strengthen the capacity of these universities to remain active in the future in this area of research.
Besides better science, we also need better estimates of
ecosystem services for use in cost-benefit analysis. At the federal level, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is central to current
agency decisions but its legitimacy is sharply contested. For the
past three decades, regulatory agencies, like the EPA, have
been required to perform cost-benefit analyses and to presumptively base their decisions on the results.239 While CBA is controversial, it shows no sign of disappearing, and it is important
that the crucial ecosystem services provided by the Gulf be
properly valued when the federal government makes decision.240 This is another area where the oil spill is likely, ironically, to provide useful assistance, as the government seeks to
establish natural resources damages.241 Section 1002(b)(2)(A) of
the Oil Pollution Act authorizes the federal government or other public trustees to recover “[d]amages for injury to, destruction of, loss of, or loss of use of, natural resources, including the
reasonable costs of assessing the damage.”242 Thus, the litigation process itself will generate a great deal of valuable scientific and economic information about the Gulf coast.243
Civil litigation could be another source of funding for insti-

239. Regulatory review takes place within the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). For a description of the development of the Office
of Management and Budget’s (OMB) role in regulatory oversight, along with
some useful suggestions for improving cost-benefit analysis and for collected
papers reflecting the spectrum of views about CBA and its validity, see COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES
(Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2000); REFORMULATING
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (Winston Harrington et al. eds. 2009);
RICHARD REVESZ & MICHAEL LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST
BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR
HEALTH (2008); Daniel H. Cole, “Best Practice” Standards for Regulatory Benefit-Cost Analysis, 23 RES. IN LAW & ECON. 1 (2007).
240. For further discussion of the ecosystem services approach, see James
Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 870 (2005); James Salzman et al., Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309 (2001).
241. See James W. Boyd, How Do You Put a Price on Marine Oil Pollution
Damages, RESOURCES, Summer 2010, at 22.
242. 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (b)(2)(A) (2006).
243. The effort to collect the relevant scientific data is described in Matthew P. Coglianese, The Importance of Determining Potential Chronic Natural
Resource Damages From the Deepwater Horizon Accident, 40 ENV. L. REP.
11,100 (2010).

2 FARBER FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE)

72

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

2/15/2012 12:19 PM

[Vol. 13:1

tutional infrastructure. Class action litigation is already pending as a result of the spill.244 Frequently, there are insufficient
claimants to use up all of a class recovery, and the funds are
then allocated through settlement or by the court in order to
provide indirect benefits to the class members.245 Under the cy
pres doctrine, judges enjoy broad discretion to allocate the
funds, although uses that have some nexus to the subject of the
litigation are usually favored.246 These funds could well be used
to strengthen environmental groups in the Gulf region and
strengthen environmental programs at Gulf colleges and universities. Without reliable scientific information from trusted
local sources, action to save the Gulf will remain elusive—
though obviously information by itself is no guarantee of an
appropriate regulatory response.
Private philanthropy could also serve a valuable role in
strengthening civil society in the Gulf region. The available
amounts of money are not likely to be vast. But, environmental
actors in the Gulf are so poorly funded that even small infusions of cash could have a dramatic impact. A federal judge
could well foster such funding during the cy pres process by
taking “bids” from organizations, with the value of the bid to be
judged partly on the basis of merit (proposed projects, prior
record of success, strong institutional capacity) and partly on
the organization’s securing a commitment for matching funds
from the charitable sector. This would allow cy pres funds to be
leveraged with private philanthropy.
The current financial weakness of key institutions in the
Gulf region means that it would take huge amounts of funding
to fully remedy the situation. On the other hand, because the
current baseline is low, the marginal effect of additional funding may be relatively large. Thus, even modest increases in
funding could have significant effects on the vitality and activity of these institutions.

244. By June, before the spill had ended, one website reported a “class action lawsuit frenzy.” See Greg Jacobs, BP Oil Spill Sparks Class Action LawGOAL
GROUP
BLOG
(June
4,
2010),
suit
Frenzy,
THE
http://thegoalgroup.wordpress.com/2010/06/04/bp-oil-spill-sparks-class-actionlawsuit-frenzy/.
245. Sam Yospe, Note, Cy Pres Distributions in Class Action Settlements,
2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1014, 1015–16 (2009).
246. Id. at 1024–27.

2 FARBER FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE BP BLOWOUT

2/15/2012 12:19 PM

73

IV. CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the BP oil spill was yet another insult to
already threatened human and biological communities. It
would be hard to think of a more challenging venue for addressing environmental problems. The mix of problems is forbidding,
including rapidly eroding wetlands, climate change, endangered species, and a gigantic aquatic dead zone. These problems have mostly been the subject of not-so-benign neglect,
akin to the regulatory neglect that cumulated in the disastrous
BP oil spill.
The political problems are also daunting. Five states border the Gulf, of which two are among the nation’s poorest and
least environmentally oriented. Another thirty states contribute to the hypoxia problem. The oil industry has been a major
contributor to the problems and exercises great political clout
in the region. In short, the term “collective action problem” does
not begin to explain the economic and political complexities.
Successfully addressing these problems will require major
new regulatory initiatives to prevent loss of wetlands, protect
endangered species, and control hypoxia. It will also require
heavy financial assistance to fund these initiatives and provide
appropriate flood protection to the Gulf Coast. The political will
for these measures may not exist as yet. This political will may
depend on changes in our national politics beyond anyone’s
power to control, and in any event is not on the immediate
horizon. In the meantime, however, we must continue to work
in the right direction and to create the infrastructure to implement more ambitious programs when the political climate allows.
The BP oil spill itself may indirectly assist in improving
the situation. Through cy pres settlements, voluntary payments
by BP, and perhaps civil penalties, the spill may provide funding to strengthen the institutional and scientific foundation for
environmental regulation. The spill has already helped
strengthen NEPA in its application to offshore oil and gas projects, and it could help revitalize CZMA. With luck, better regulations will address the safety of future oil operations in the
Gulf. Perhaps most importantly, the acute crisis of the spill has
helped mobilize attention to the Gulf, which may help catalyze
responses to the Gulf’s chronic ills.
The Gulf’s problems are a preview of the difficulties we are
likely to face in this century, with eroding coasts and wetlands
and ecological disruption threatening coastal communities and
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their livelihoods. Climate change will unsettle marine and
coastal ecosystems in many parts of the world, while rising seas
erode coastal areas and threaten cities with flooding. We need
to learn how to deal with these issues today before they arise at
greater scale and severity tomorrow. By beginning to focus on
the problems of the Gulf, we will obtain valuable expertise with
applications in other parts of the United States and in places
around the world.
Thus, the Gulf is a valuable laboratory for learning to address the environmental upheavals we can expect to come. But
the Gulf is also worth saving for its own sake. As Mike Tidwell,
the journalist whose words began this article, has aptly said,
“What’s being lost is an American treasure, a place as big as
the Everglades and just as beautiful.”247

247. TIDWELL, supra note 1, at 6.

